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Several unintentional hypergolic fluid related spills, fires, and explosions from the Apollo
Program, the Space Shuttle Program, the Titan Program, and a few others have occurred
over the past several decades. Spill sites include the following government facilities: Kennedy
Space Center (KSC), Johnson Space Center (JSC), White Sands Test Facility (WSTF),
Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB), Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS), Edwards
Air Force Base (EAFB), Little Rock AFB, and McConnell AFB. Until now, the only method
of capturing the lessons learned from these incidents has been "word of mouth" or by
studying each individual incident report. Through studying several dozen of these incidents,
certain root cause themes are apparent. Scrutinizing these themes could prove to be highly
beneficial to future hypergolic system test, checkout, and operational use.
I.	 Introduction
Hypergolic fluids are toxic liquids that react spontaneously and violently when they contact each other. These
fluids are used in many different rocket and aircraft systems for propulsion and hydraulic power including: orbiting
satellites, manned spacecraft, military aircraft, and deep space probes. Hypergolic fuels include hydrazine (N2H4)
and its derivatives including: monomethylhydrazine (MMH), unsymmetrical di-methylhydrazine (UDMH), and
Aerozine 50 (A-50), which is an equal mixture of N 21­14 and UDMH. The oxidizer used with these fuels is usually
nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4), also known as dinitrogen tetroxide or NTO, and various blends of N2O4 with nitric oxide
(NO).
Several documented, unintentional hypergolic fluid spills and fires related to the Apollo Program, the Space
Shuttle Program, and several other programs from approximately 1968 through the spring of 2009 have been studied
for the primary purpose of extracting the lessons learned. Spill sites include Kennedy. Space Center (KSC), Johnson
Space Center (JSC), White Sands Test Facility (WSTF), Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB), Cape Canaveral Air
Force Station (CCAFS), Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB), Little Rock AFB, and McConnell AFB.
A. Properties of Nitrogen Tetroxide (N2O4)
Nitrogen tetroxide is a strong oxidizing agent that is used with the hydrazine family of fuels for rocket propulsion
in the vacuum of space. It was accepted as the rocket propellant oxidizer of choice in the early 1950's by the
U.S.S.R. and the United States. N 2O4 itself is nonflammable, non-explosive, and does not exothermically
decompose; however, when added to a fire it will increase the intensity of combustion and burning rate by providing
an additional oxygen source to the air. 1 N2O4 is highly corrosive and extremely toxic. N2O4 is a liquid in equilibrium
with nitrogen. dioxide (NO 2) vapor: N2O4 (liquid) H 2NO2 (vapor). This equilibrium favors the vapor with
increasing temperature and/or decreasing pressure. This is reversible when conditions are opposite. N 2O4 is available
in various "grades" ranging from pure N 2O4 to 25% NO.
When N2O4 liquid or NO 2 vapor come in contact with skin, eyes, or the respiratory system, the oxides of nitrogen
react with water to produce nitric acid (HNO 3) and nitrous acid (HONO) that typically destroy tissue. Together,
these compounds oxidize the moist and flexible inner tissue of the alveoli sacs within the lungs when inhaled which
can lead to build-up of fluid (edema) and in extreme cases, death. In non-mortal exposure cases, tissue may heal
"Fire, Explosion, Compatibility, and Safety Hazards of Nitrogen Tetroxide." American Institute of Aeronautics
and Astronautics Special Project Report. AIAA SP-086-2001. 2001.
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with scarring (in the location where the tissue was significantly exposed), leading to destruction of the small airways
and air sacs. Survivors may have varying degrees of permanent restrictive lung disease with pulmonary fibrosis.2
N2O4 and NO2 also have several other unique properties. N2O4 (NOD vapors are approximately three times
heavier than air and liquid N 2O4 evaporates about five times faster than water at room temperature.' The vapors of
MON-3 are normally reddish-brown in color, which is caused by rapid vaporization of NO2. Liquid N2O4 and its
vapors will explode on contact with hydrazine fuels, amines, and alcohol. Ignition may also occur when N 2O4 comes'
into contact with wood, paper, hydrocarbon fuels, and some adhesives. A mixture of N 2O4 and halogenated solvents:
carbon tetrachloride, trichloroethylene, perchloroethylene, etc., may produce a violent explosion.' MON-3 N 2O4 (the
most commonly used N2O4) has the following properties: 1,3,4,5
•	 Molecular Weight 92.016
•	 Relative Vapor Density 1.58
•	 N2O4
 + NO, % 99.5
•	 Boiling Point (14.7 psia), OF 70.1
•	 Freezing Point, OF 11.8
•	 Vapor Pressure (77 °F), psia 17.4
•	 Specific Gravity (77 °F) 1.423
•	 Ignition Capability Not flammable
•	 Odor Bleach-like
•	 Odor Threshold, ppm 1 to 3
• Exposure limit, ppm	 3.0 (exposure limit for NASA hardware processing)
•	 Density (77 OF & 14.7 psia), lb,,,/gal 11.96
B. Properties of Hydrazine (N2H4) and Monomethylhydrazine (MMH)
Monopropellant grade hydrazine (N 2H4) is the fuel used in the Auxiliary Power Units (APU) on the Space
Shuttle Orbiters and the Hydraulic Power Units (HPU) on the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) to
generate high pressure gas for hydraulic power of the orbiter's aero surfaces and the SRB's thrust vector control
system. N21 ­14 is also used on many spacecraft for monopropellant rocket propulsion systems (on the order of tenths
to hundreds of pounds of thrust per rocket engine). To produce thrust, monopropellant rockets utilize a metal-based
agent to catalytically decompose the N2114 into ammonia, nitrogen, and hydrogen. Propellant grade hydrazine
contains about 98.5% pure N21­14 with the remaining 1.5% being primarily water. Aerozine 50 (along with N 2O4) was
used for the first and second stages of the Titan II Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and Titan space launch
vehicles including the 23G (a variant of the Titan II used for launching medium-sized spacecraft), IIIB, IIIC, and IV.
The Titan II, IIIB, IIIC, and IV rockets used the largest quantities of hypergolic propellants per launch in the history
of the United States rocket fleet (for the first stage approximately 13,000 gallons of N 2O4 and 11,000 gallons of A-
50 were used along with 3,100 gallons of N2O4 and 1,700 gallons of A-50 for the second stage).
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) classify N21­14 and its derivatives as a possible
carcinogen. 4 When hydrazine and its derivatives come into contact with tissue, the exposed person will usually
suffer from chemical burns unless the liquid is quickly rinsed off the skin using water. N 21­14 and its derivatives are
extremely toxic, highly flammable, and highly corrosive. "Hydrazines and their vapors explode on contact with
strong oxidizers, such as N 2O4i hydrogen peroxide, fluorine, and halogen fluorides. Additionally, they react on
contact with metallic oxides, such as iron, copper, lead, manganese, and molybdenum to produce fire or explosion.s3
2 Myers, Jeffrey, M.D. "RE: Hyper Spills & Accidents Lessons Learned Report — Toxicology of NO2 Inhalation." E-
mail to Jeffrey Myers and Frank Golan. August 7 2008.
3 Hall, George F., Raymond Lake, John H. Storm, and Ross J. Utt. "Fire Protection Research and Development
Requirements Analysis for USAF Space Systems and Ground Support Facilities Volume I — Fire Protection
Operational Requirements Analysis." Flight Dynamics Directorate Wright Laboratory Air Force Materiel
Command, Tyndall Air Force Base, FL. WL-TR-96-3010. April, 1995.
4 Rathgeber, Kurt A., Bruce Havenor, and Steven D. Hornung Ph.D. "Hypergol Systems: Design, Buildup, and
Operation." NSTC Course 055. January 6, 2006.
5 United States. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare (DREW), Public Health Service, Center for Disease
Control, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). "Occupational Exposure to Hydrazines."
NIOSH Criteria for a Recommended Standard. U.S. DHEW (NIOSH) Publication No. 78-172. June 1978.
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Hydrazine fires produce little to no smoke or colorful flames. N2H4 has a tendency to react exothermically with
or without an oxidizer present (the reaction increases the temperature thus increasing the reaction rate; this is also
known as a thermal runaway reaction). Another way to describe a hydrazine thermal runaway reaction is "...the rate
of heat generation by the reaction exceeds the rate of heat removal from the system. "6 This process is directly related
to the auto-ignition temperature, which decreases as pressure increases. The exothermic reaction can end in an
explosion if one or more of the following conditions are met within the system containing the hydrazine: the
reacting system is confined to a rigid volume; the reacting system is adiabatic or nearly adiabatic; the reaction rate
increases with temperature; or if the hydrazine is subjected to rapid over-pressurization through "water hammer."7
The following are properties of N2H4: 4,5,8
• Molecular Weight
•	 Boiling Point (14.7 psia), OF
• Freezing Point, OF
• Vapor Pressure (77 °F), psia
• Ignition Capability
• Auto-ignites in Air, OF
• Ratio of Specific Heat (gas)
• Odor
• Odor Threshold, ppm
• Exposure Limit, ppm
• Density (77 OF & 14.7 psia), lb./gal
32.045
237.6
34.75
0.96
4.7 to 100% by volume in air
437 (increases with decreasing pressure)
1.19
Ammonia; fishy
2to3
0.01 (exposure limit for NASA hardware processing)
8.38
Monomethylhydrazine is the fuel used in the Orbital Maneuvering System and Reaction Control System
(OMS/RCS) on the Space Shuttle Orbiters. Monomethyl-hydrazine, N 2H3(CH3), is similar to hydrazine, N21­14i with
the exception that it contains a methyl group in its molecule in place of one hydrogen atom. Propellant grade MMH
contains 98% pure N2H3 (CH3 ) with the remaining 2% being primarily water. MMH is not used for monopropellant
rocket propulsion because the carbon formed in its decomposition contaminates the catalyst. It is extremely toxic,
highly flammable, and highly corrosive. MMH has
,
	compatibility with metals as compared to N2O4.
MMH may have a slight yellow-orange tinted flame. As with N 21­14i MMH can also react exothermically with or
without an oxidizer present, but the reaction rate has been found to be much slower than N 2H4. MMH vapor has also
been found to be much less sensitive to detonation as compared to N 2H4 . 6 As a result of the molecular differences in
comparison to N2H4, MMH has slightly different properties as shown below:, 3,4,7
• Molecular Weight
• Boiling Point (14.7 psia), OF
• Freezing Point, OF
• Vapor Pressure (77 °F), psia
•	 Ignition Capability
• Auto-ignites in Air, OF
• Ratio of Specific Heat (gas)
• Odor
• Odor Threshold, ppm
• Exposure Limit, ppm
• Density (77 OF & 14.7 psia), lbm/gal
46.075
189.5
-62.5
3.23
2.5 to 98% by volume in air
286 to 386 (increases with decreasing pressure)
1.13
Amine; fishy
1 to 3
0.01 (exposure limit for NASA hardware processing)
7.27
The vapor densities of all hydrazines are greater than air and the evaporation rate is approximately the same as
water at room temperature. N 2H4 liquid at room temperature and pressure is clear and oily. N2H4 and MMH are
6 Benz, F. J. and M. D. Pedley. "A Comparison of the Explosion Hazards of Hydrazine and Methylhydrazine in
Aerospace Environments." CPIA-PUB-455, Volume 1, pp 477-488. 1986.
7 "Fire, Explosion, Compatibility, and Safety Hazards of Hypergols — Monomethylhydrazine." American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics Special Project Report. AIAA SP-085-1999. 1999.
8 "Fire, Explosion, Compatibility, and Safety Hazards of Hypergols — Hydrazine. American Institute of Aeronautics
and Astronautics Special Project Report. AIAA SP-084-1999. 1999.
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hygroscopic (they readily absorbs water); therefore, water is widely used as a diluting agent. A liquid mixture of
58% water and 42% hydrazine or MMH by weight prevents ignition in an open air environment. A vapor mixture of
65% water and 35% hydrazine or MMH is considered nonflammable in air.8
C. Summary of Pertinent Hypergolic Fluid Properties
NASA follows a strict time weighted average exposure concentration limit for N2H4i MMH, and N2O4 for
personnel safety during vehicle and ground support system processing. "NASA Centers shall utilize OSHA PEL's
[Permissible Exposure Limit], Threshold Limit Values (TLV) issued by the American Conference of Governmental
Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH)... i9 From these two organizations, NASA established that the TLV for N2H4 and
MMH would be 0.01 ppm and 3 ppm for N2O4 for a conventional 8-hour work day and 40-hour work week. The
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health's Recommended Exposure Limit (NIOSH REL) ceiling (120
minute time weighted average) for N2O4
 is 1.0 ppm. Several NASA Centers have chosen to use this lower value (1.0
ppm) for their oxidizer system processing for a conventional 8-hour work day and 40-hour work week.
It may seem odd that with all these seemingly negative characteristics (and the large amount of incidents when
compared to other commodities), spacecraft designers still choose to use hypergols for propulsion systems. This is
primarily due to the fact that hypergols are storable and stable (as long as they are contained properly), have a high
specific impulse when used for propulsion, are stable to impact as long as there is no spark, can withstand the
extremes of hot and cold which are present in the vacuum of space with fewer controls than cryogenic propellants,
and can be frozen and then thawed without detrimental effects to their chemical properties or storage vessels since
they contract when frozen. However, care needs to be taken when hypergols are frozen in tubing as this can lead to
over-pressurization during thaw (depending on the thaw pattern in the tubing). This is why thermal control of tubing
is very important in hypergol systems.
II.	 Results and Discussion
A total of 45 hypergolic related incidents were studied for the purpose of compiling common lessons learned.
Table 1 and Appendix B summarize the fuel and oxidizer incidents; however, it should be noted that if the numbers
in Table 1 are summed in a particular category, the resulting value does not equal 45 because some of the incidents
involve multiple commodities or root causes, for example. Appendix B clarifies this difference between the total
studied incidents and the summation of the numbers in Table 1.
As shown in Table 1, the ratio of fuel to oxidizer incidents is approximately one-to-one. Also, the severity
(personnel injury or the extent of the hardware damage) was approximately the same when comparing fuel and
oxidizer incidents. One key difference between a fuel and an oxidizer incident is that a fuel incident has the potential
to become very dangerous quite abruptly as compared to an oxidizer incident because of the potential for fire or
explosion. Many of the incidents were directly related to some sort of human error along with the occurrence of the
event usually taking place during commodity transfer of commodity or opening of a system. Some examples of
human error include ground support equipment (GSE) mis-configurations, incorrect valve cycling, poor design of
vehicle or GSE (caused by deficient initial requirements or inadequate acceptance testing), training plans that lack
the appropriate content, improper system knowledge, immature or inadequate procedures, and improper system
monitoring or situational awareness.
Advance warning (prior to any liquid or vapor release) was available in several of the incidents to the technicians
in the vicinity of the spill and/or the engineers that were monitoring from a remote location. The warning indications
include off-nominal data (remote or local), off-nominal system characteristics, and/or local changes that occurred
without human intervention. Some of these went unnoticed or were ignored during the operation, thus resulting in an
incident. There was advance warning in 19 out of 38.total incidents (50% of the time). This percentage does not
include spilled fuel as an advance warning of a fire (5 occurrences). Depending on the local environment, there is a
reasonable probability that if hydrazine (or one of its derivatives) is spilled, there will be a fire; therefore, the fuel
spill itself could be considered an advance warning of a fuel fire. Roughly 42% of the documented fuel spills studied
resulted in a fire or explosion. It was unable to be determined if there was an advanced warning for two of the
incidents; therefore, they were not included in the above percentage along with the mentioned 5 fuel spills.
9 United States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. "NASA Occupational Health Program
Procedures." NPR 1800.1 Revision C. Oct: 6, 2009.
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Table 1: Hypergol Spill and Fire Summary.
Oxidizer Incidents:	 Fuel Incidents:
23 Total (16 liquid and 7 vapor)	 24 Total
3 Led to a Fire	 8 Led to a Fire
3 Led to an Explosion	 2 Led to an Explosion
8 Led to Injuries or Death	 7 Led to Injuries or Death
12 Led to Hardware Damage
	 12 Led to Hardware Damage
10 Oxidizer or Fuel Incidents in Which There was No Hardware Damage or Injuries
Root Causes:
7 Procedure Adherence/Control (engineer or technician did not follow procedure or protocols were ignored)
1 l Improper Personnel Training (engineers or technicians were untrained or too inexperienced)
17 Technician or Operator Error (technician and/or engineers making a real-time error)
24 Improper GSE/Vehicle Design (improper materials, unknown low points, incompatibilities, etc.)
11 Improper Configuration Management (system configuration and upkeep errors that led to an incident)
Incident Occurred:
18 During Commodity Transfer
15 During a Component Removal and Replacement Procedure
41 During a Hypergol Operation (nominal system processing)
13 During Opened Hyper System
3 In a Static Hyper System
Some common lessons learned deduced from the various root causes of the studied incidents are shown in the
following list. If these items were properly addressed prior to the incidents, prevention may have been possible (in
hindsight) or the ramifications of the incident could have been reduced.
• Improper configuration control and internal or external human performance shaping factors can lead to a
false comfort level
• Vent systems are often neglected and treated as non-hazardous even though they can capture and
contain condensed hypergolic liquids (especially in low points)
• Aging support hardware should be routinely inspected to reduce the risk of a failure during critical
operations
• Communication breakdown can escalate an incident to a level where injuries occur or hardware is damaged
o Communication protocols should be pre-coordinated prior to an operation
• Improper propulsion system and ground support system designs can destine a system for failure
o Every effort should be made to design out low points in GSE
•	 Improper training of technicians, engineers, and safety personnel can put lives in danger
• Inadequate knowledge of potential electrostatic discharge hazards while working fuel operations
can lead to a fire or explosion
• Knowledge of instrumentation error and/or offsets are very important for system oversight
• Unknown incompatibilities (from lack of training or research) with propellants can cause
surprising failures
• If an incident does occur, the system should immediately be placed into a stable configuration;
following this, the procedure should be stopped to assess the problem and its possible
ramifications
• A heightened amount of situational awareness of technicians and engineers working operations
can reduce the risk of an incident and decrease the possibility of injuries or damage if an incident
does occur .
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• Improper personal protective equipment, spill protection, and staging of fire extinguishing equipment can
result in unnecessary injuries or hardware damage if an incident occurs
• Improper procedural oversight (along with the development of and adherence to the procedure) can be
detrimental and quickly lead to an incident
o Improper emergency procedures can increase the risk of injuries or hardware damage
• Improper local cleanliness or housekeeping (for example iron oxide or rust) can result in fires or explosions
• A thorough hypergol system evacuation should be completed (wherever a vacuum is tolerable by the
system) prior to the removal or disconnection of any hypergolic propellant fittings
o A pulse purge using nitrogen or helium has proven to be inadequate for the removal of residual
propellants
III.	 Conclusion
Some type of human error can be traced to nearly every studied incident as a root cause, whether it be an error in
the design phase or an error prior to or during operational use of hardware containing hypergols. Humans are most
definitely not perfect and even when the most knowledgeable personnel are intimately involved in the design phase
(vehicle or GSE) or during an operation, mistakes can be made and critical items can be overlooked. One can
deduce, however, that most incidents happen during some sort of dynamic operation. Hypergols tend to be very
stable in a static configuration (as long as the compatibility characteristics have been well addressed).
Hypergolic rocket propellants have proven to be a highly reliable asset in manned and unmanned spaceflight;
however, their maintenance on the ground has proven to be relatively difficult. Do the operational risks from
possible human errors or hardware failures causing a catastrophic incident outweigh the usefulness of hypergols
even though they have been used for the last 50 years of manned and unmanned spaceflight? One would have to say
probably not, since hypergols are so widely used in the space industry currently and are being proposed to be used
on many vehicles in the future. Therefore, ground operations on hypergol systems have become increasingly
scrutinized for possible unknowns, and rightfully so. The data shown in this report are not an example of why we
should not be using hypergolic propellants on spacecraft and launch vehicles, but rather illustrates what we can and
should do to mitigate possible unforeseen ground operation and/or design problems.
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Appendix A
Acronym List
A-50 Aerozine-50
ACGIH American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists
AFB Air Force Base
APU Auxiliary Power Unit
CCAFS Cape Canaveral Air Force Station
DHEW Department of Health, Education, & Welfare
EAFB Edwards Air Force base
GSE Ground Support Equipment
HMF Hypergolic Maintenance Facility (located at KSC)
HNO3 Nitric Acid
HONO Nitrous Acid
HPU Hydraulic Power Unit
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
JSC Johnson Space Center
KSC Kennedy Space Center
LC Launch Complex
MMH Monomethylhydrazine (N2H3(CH3))
MON Mixed Oxides of Nitrogen
N21-14 Hydrazine
N2O4 Nitrogen Tetroxide (also known as Di-Nitrogen Tetroxide or NTO)
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NIOSH National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health
NO Nitrous Oxide
NO2 Nitrogen Dioxide
NSTC NASA Safety Training Center
NTO Nitrogen Tetroxide (also known as Di-Nitrogen Tetroxide)
OMS Orbital Maneuvering System
OPF Orbiter Processing Facility (located at KSC)
ORSU Oxidizer Ready Storage Unit (located at WSTF)
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
P Pressure
PEL Permissible Exposure Limit
ppm Parts Per Million
psia Pounds Per Square Inch Absolute
psig Pounds Per Square Inch Gage
R Rankine
RCS Reaction Control System
REL Recommended Exposure Limit
SLC Space Launch Complex
SPS Spacecraft Propulsion System
SRB Solid Rocket Booster
STS Space Transportation System
T Temperature
TLV Toxic Vapor Level
TWA Time Weighted Average
U.S.S.R. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UDMH Unsymmetrical Di-methylhydrazine
USAF United States Air Force
VAFB Vandenberg Air Force Base
VP . Vapor Pressure
WSTF White Sands Test Facility
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Appendix B
Summary of Incidents
Incident Location 	 S
-
and Description	 Date	 Quantil Z Z z z
LC-34 Apollo 7 SPS	 Sep-	 —1 to 2	 X X X	 XN2O4 Spill	 1968	 gal
Apollo-Soyuz
Landing Astronaut Jul-	 Vapors X X X X	 X
N2O4 Vapor 1975
Exposure
Enterprise APU 1 Jun-Cavity Seal N21-14 1977	 —5 gal X X X	 X	 XSpill
Silo 533-7 Titan 11 Aug- 13,450Silo Large Scale 1978 alg`
X X X X X	 X
N 2O4 Spill
OPF1 N2H4 Spill Nov-Following APU 1979 ^2 gal X X X	 XHotfire
Silo 374-7 Titan 11
1Explosion Following 1980 gal X X X X X X X XA-50 Spill
OPF1Wrong Flight Jul-Cap N2O4 Vapor 1981 X X X	 X	 X XRelease
Jul
Vapors
Pad 39A MMH
Exposure Following 1981 < %: gal X X X X X	 X X XFlexhose Removal
OPF1 STS-2 Right Fall-
_1 tsp X X X X X	 X XPod MMH Fire 1981
Pad 39A STS-2 Sep- 15 to 20 X X X X	 X	 XN2O4 Spill 1981 gal
Pad 39A MMH Spill Jun- 15 to 25
and Fire During 1982 gal X X X X X	 X X XValve Replacement
Pad 39A N2O4 Feb-Vapor Release from 1983 Vapors X X X	 XFlange Gasket
Apr-
Apr-OPFI Forward RCS ^	 '/, toFerry Plug Removal 1983 X X X	 X XMMH Spi11 cup
STS-9 APU I and 2 Dec-Explosion on 1983 ^1 gal X X X X	 X	 X
Runway
0PF2 N2O4 Vapor Feb-Release from Loose 1984 Vapors X X X	 XFitting
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Incident Location
^	 4
'	 ffi^PCIIi^$i^3_	 ^yCP.4^ 3^M^^^sa3af lia^Rf^rPPr •^^M^a ^
CCAFS Propellant
Storage Area Tanker 1984 < 2 gal	 X	 X
	 1 +11 
	
X	 X 	 X X
MMH Fire
OPFI Liquid Trap in
Purge Adapter 1985 ' —1 cup X X X X X XFlexhose MMH Spill
Dec-Pad 39A STS-61 CSRB HPU Loading 1985 ^3 gal X X X X XN2H4 Spill
Pad 39A Inadvertent
Dry Well Removal 1986 —100 gal X X X X X X XMMH Spill
Pad 39A Oxidizer
Relief Valve Jul- Vapors X X X X X X XReplacement N 2O4 1986
Vapor Release
< %: gal X X X X X XOPf&rench N 2H4 Sep-Spill and Fire 1986
Jun-Pad 39B N 2O4 andInsulation Adhesive ^2 tbsp X X X X X X
Small Fire 1988
Pad 39B STS-26R Jul -N 204 Tubing Leak 1988 Vapors X X X X X X
on Vehicle
WSTF Fuel Waste Feb- None X X X X XFlash Fire 1990 spilled
WSTF Aspiration of
N2O4 into Fuel Vent 1990 ^2 tbsp X X X X X X XSystem
HMF Screens Test Dec- —1 to 2 X X X X X XDrum MM H Spill 1990 gal
OPF3 STS-42 Ferry Feb- —Y< to Y44Plug Removal MMH 1992 X X X X X
.Spill cup
Nov-WSTF IncorrectFlight Cap N2O4 1992 —1 cup X X X X X X X
Exposure
JSC Thermo-
—16Chemical Test Area 994 20 gal X X X X X X X X XN2O4 Vapor Release
SLC -41 Titan IV A Aug- 350 to X X X X XK-9 N 2O4 Spill 1994 400 gal
OPF1 STS-69 Left Dec- < 1 cup X X X X X X X XPod MMH Fire 1994
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Incident Location
and Description Date
r..
1 
^a.a-0^.....^
OPFI STS-69 Right May-
< 1 cup X	 XXX XX	 X
117Pod MMH Fire 1995
WSTF ORSU Open Mar-Manual Valve N2O4 1996 i —90 gal X
1 X I
X X X
Spill
Feb-OPF2 GSE MMH
^l pint X X X X X XSpill 1997
HMF Sample Valve Mar-
—% cup X X X X XMMH Spill 1997
SLC-4E Titan IV K- Jul-
—244 gal X X X X18 N 2O4 Spill 1997
Pad 39B Slope N2O4 Nov- 25 to 50 X X X X X XSpill 1997 gal
OPF3 STS-109 APU Aug-
< 5 tbsp X X X X X XN2 1­1 4 Spill 1999
WSTF Pathfinder
~	
2Axial Engine Valve 000 gal X X X X
X X
Failure
Aug-WSTF Pathfinder
_1 cup X X X X X XSmall MMH Fire 2000
WSTF Pressure _
Transducer 003 quarts X X X X X
X
Explosion
LC-40 Titan IV
N 2O4 Pump 003 •-40 gal X X X X X X
X X
Explosion
HMF STS-115 Right Jun-
_ 1.4 gal X X X X X XPod
-
 N2O4 Spill 2004
WSTF N2H4 Spill
Following Manual 2005 —74 gal X X X X XValve Failure
HMF STS-121	 Jan-Forward RCS N2O4	 2006 —2.9 gal X X X X X XSpill
15 7 2 8 2 7 12 16 7 3 3 18 11211017 11 17 24 11118115141 1313 1
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